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DEVELOPMENT, GLOBALIZATION, AND LAW
Robert L. Kuttner*
I. A DEVELOPMENT PARADOX
Is global commerce under essentially laissez-faire rules optimal for
economic development? In this era of liberated and deregulated markets,
and after the final collapse of communism, a great many commentators
would consider that a self-evident question. Of course free global com-
merce is good for economic development, because we know that the
freest possible markets produce the most efficient use of resources and
the highest available rates of economic growth. And growth benefits de-
velopment. How could it be otherwise?
And what is the role of law in facilitating commerce and in contour-
ing a particular regime of domestic and transnational commerce and
capital flows? Isn't the global role of law to define property rights and
limit the interference and distortion imposed by states, and thus, again,
to optimize outcomes?
In exploring these questions, we have to begin with a paradox. All of
the world's leading economies are located in countries that, by various
political routes, have evolved into what Paul Samuelson called mixed
economies: systems that are basically capitalist, but that limit absolute
private property rights and capital flows, not just for the sake of equity or
sustainability, but to constrain opportunism, to complement private
investment with necessary public goods, to compensate for the market's
inaccurate pricing, and to temper the instability of a market system prone
to bouts of overshooting. So the modem capitalist economy has central
banks, regulatory bodies like the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and extensive programs of public investment and social insurance.
Member Countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) tend to spend between a third and half of their
gross domestic product (GDP) socially. We balance between property
rights and the rights of workers, tenants, and citizens to breathe the air and
drink the water. Despite the claims of laissez-faire theory, each of the
wealthy nations has opted for some brand of mixed economy to produce
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more economically efficient outcomes than would be produced by
laissez-faire means. We do this, not at some regrettable cost to efficiency,
but, because laissez-faire markets make systemic mistakes, to enhance
efficiency.
My book, Everything for Sale: The Virtues and Limits of Markets,'
examines what markets do well, and where they fail. I conclude that
markets are powerful engines of growth and allocation of scarce re-
sources, but that market failures are not isolated, special cases. They are,
rather, systemic problems caused by the fact that markets, by their very
nature, are myopic as well as dynamic, and price many things disas-
trously wrong. I am speaking here not of value preferences, or
sentimental social choices made at the expense of economic growth.
Rather, I am speaking of the pure free market's failure to optimize eco-
nomic performance itself.
Among the things that markets fail to price correctly are: education,
health, research, technical innovation, public infrastructure, pollution,
depletion of natural resources, and even currencies and other financial
instruments. Many of the things that markets price wrong, such as educa-
tion, public infrastructure, health, research, and the quality of public
governance, are themselves necessary inputs to economic development.
Even those who support more market-like measures in, for example,
education or the control of pollution, acknowledge that tax revenues are
necessary to support voucher schools, and a publicly created trading
market in emissions, under a publicly regulated cap, are necessary to
allow these market-like inventions to proceed.
Markets, especially financial markets, tend to overshoot. Their mis-
takes are not instantly corrected by other market forces. Influential
players in financial markets take advantage of their privileged position
and steer investors to misallocate capital, sometimes running into the
trillions of dollars, as in the case of the recent Wall Street scandals and
stock market bubble. Imagine the indignation if governments misallo-
cated that amount of money. Markets yield income distributions that not
even the champions of laissez-faire defend. One can have a society in
which some people literally have more money than they know what to
do with while others starve. That society can be efficient by the lights of
the free market because allocative efficiency is said to operate at any
given income distribution. One can also have economic equilibrium with
twenty percent unemployment.
We have painfully learned this lesson since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. The diverse forms of managed capitalism in our several countries
1. ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS
(1997).
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do not primarily reflect the insights of economists and lawyers in semi-
nar rooms. Rather, they are the result of political struggles in Nation-
States involving citizens, political parties, and economic interest groups.
The necessarily messy democracy does not invariably produce optimal
policies, but there is no way for markets to exist without rules, and rules
are made by governments, democratic or otherwise. And while some
utopian theorists argue for pure laissez-faire, there is a general consensus
that a degree of regulation and of social investment is salutary for eco-
nomic outcomes.
Curiously, however, when the subject turns to cross border trade and
transnational flows of capital, it is as if we have discarded the practical
lessons of the past century and a half. The assumption, suddenly, is that
laissez-faire is optimal after all. This is a doubly dubious premise, as the
global economy, because it outruns the writ of national authority, is, if
anything, even more prone to instability than nationally governed
economies. By what alchemy does the market system, which is not op-
timal as a laissez-faire system within nations, somehow become optimal
as a laissez-faire system between or among nations?
This brings me to the question of the role of law in the international
trading system. Domestically, law defines the citizen's relationship to the
government-including property rights; thus, law allows commerce to
proceed. Law also defines other rights that complement and sometimes
constrain property rights for the sake of efficiency or equity, for example
in asserting the collectivity's right to tax and invest socially, or limiting
the absolute right of an employer to fire an employee, or the absolute
right of a property owner to dispose of sewage.
But in the context of a trade regime, the function of law is more
complex and ambiguous. It can serve to create rough balance and fair-
ness in the rules of trade among nations that have different domestic
economic systems. Some States, for instance, may choose to have a
greater or lesser role for the State in economic development. Some may
place higher value on social goods. A trade regime can devise rules that
allow commerce nonetheless to proceed equitably among nations with
different systems. Alternatively, law can try to impose a single regime on
diverse, nominally sovereign States, using the leverage of the strong on
the weak. This is invariably said to be for their own good because it
shakes loose the cobwebs of statism, exports transparency, makes emerg-
ing economies attractive to investors, and imposes the discipline of the
global financial community on budgets that are sometimes profligate. Or
so some advocates like to believe.
It is very important to disentangle these different functions of law in
creating a global trade regime and to see what is at work in any given
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case. It is a mistake to assume, with some of our law-and-economics col-
leagues, that the purpose of law is simply to maximize the conditions in
which free-market economics can flourish. Normatively, history shows
that laissez-faire treatment does not in fact optimize welfare outcomes,
much less distributive goals. Descriptively, this view is touchingly or
disingenuously naive about the realities of geopolitical power.
The neoliberal model reflects the self-interests, not of "countries,"
but of the most politically powerful actors within those countries. A
cynic might be forgiven for concluding that bankers, corporate elites,
and their allies in government are using globalization and the so-called
Washington Consensus' to return to the regime of property rights that
obtained domestically in about 1890-nearly absolute rights for prop-
erty, with scant countervailing rights for workers or citizens.
This enterprise is less about optimizing outcomes and more about
who benefits. If laissez-faire government can be imposed as the principle
of global commerce, it very usefully feeds back into domestic politics
and law. The nation with high taxes and costly social investment, or
regulatory constraints on industry and finance, or industrial policies,
finds itself priced out of the game or in violation of the international
laissez-faire rules. As the Church Lady on "Saturday Night Live" used to
say, "how convenient."
Therefore, there are really several interrelated challenges. First, how
shall we make sure necessary functions of national government, to stabi-
lize and temper brute market forces, are not hopelessly eroded by global
commerce and the ease with which globalized corporations and investors
can outrun the writ of governments and play off governments with costly
social overhead against each other?
Second, how can the advanced countries protect their mixed econo-
mies without retarding the capacity of poorer countries to develop?
Third, what are the appropriate institutions and rules for the global
economic system to reconcile both goals? To believe that the global
economy needs to be a mixed economy is not to know how to construct
it, because of course there is no global sovereign, and the issue of how to
delegate or pool sovereignty is necessarily a delicate one.
Sixty-one years ago at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in June
1944, the world's leaders attempted to create the global preconditions for
domestic mixed economies. Having rejected both the laissez-faire ap-
proach and socialism, they endeavored to reconcile their desire for a
2. The phrase "Washington Consensus" is today a very popular term in debates about
trade and development. It is often seen as synonymous with "neoliberalism." The phrase's
originator is John Williamson of the Institute for International Economics. Additional informa-
tion is available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html.
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mixed economy at home with a restoration of trade and financial flows
globally. These architects of the postwar economic system, having
learned from the man-made disasters of the recent past, endeavored to
rebuild global commerce, not as laissez-faire, but on a foundation of
broadly distributed prosperity, full employment, and economic manage-
ment, as well as political democracy. They understood that the instability
and excess of a speculative market economy in the 1920s had led to the
economic collapse and political nightmare of the 1930s, and to a second
world war. They understood that laissez-faire, taken to an extreme, was
no friend of human development, economic prosperity, or liberal democ-
racy. They were determined that the postwar institutions create a
framework in which national governments could manage the private
economy for the sake of collective human betterment, even as they pro-
moted the revival of private commerce and expanded trade.3
So, while the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) helped restore transnational financial and commercial flows, they
did so in a context of fixed exchanged rates, temporary capital controls,
substantially state-run sectors, tight domestic regulation of financial in-
stitutions, and relatively high tariffs. As the postwar boom matured, all
of these strictures were gradually relaxed, and we have now gone to the
opposite extreme.
The contrast between the vision of the founders of the Bretton
Woods institutions and those who operate them today is striking. In
1944, the architects of Bretton Woods understood the risks of competi-
tive devaluation. They understood that private global financial flows, left
on their own, would cumulatively lead to collective deflation. The purpose
of the IMF was to allow nations to stabilize their currencies without con-
tracting their economies. The idea was to inject an expansionary bias into
the system rather than a contractionary one, so that each member nation
could pursue full employment at home. This, the founders thought, would
allow nations to accept freer trade. But free trade and free movement of
capital, per se, were not the summum bonum of the system. They were
means, not ends.
Today's statesmen have a very different view; and the Bretton
Woods institutions, particularly the IMF, have become instruments for
the imposition of a single model. It is not at all clear that this approach
optimizes economic development, though it certainly benefits commer-
cial and financial elites.
As the economy globalizes, and as private capital liberates itself
from the reach of the Nation-State and the stabilization and management
3. See RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING DOLLAR DIPLOMACY (1969); see also KARL
POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).
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of national governments, we are reverting to a laissez-faire system that
has been historically proven to be unstable, unreliable, and often unbear-
able in human terms. Therefore, the task today is to reinvent a mixed
economy, under circumstances that are institutionally much more diffi-
cult than those of the postwar reconstruction. That institutional challenge
is compounded by the ideological triumphalism of the market.
The current U.S. administration is using its very substantial diplo-
matic leverage to devise international agreements that reduce the power
of the state to regulate commerce, both in the United States and in other
nations. Many perfectly legitimate state interventions for purposes of
development, stabilization, or social investment are defined as contrary
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the North American Free
Trade Association (NAFTA). Under the NAFTA Chapter 11 mechanism,
whose dynamics were little appreciated at the time of its ratification, a
corporation domiciled in any of the three NAFTA member countries may
challenge a piece of lawfully enacted environmental regulation that
treats domestic and foreign companies exactly alike as an interference
with trade. These challenges may be brought in a special NAFTA tribu-
nal, bypassing both domestic legislatures and courts. A similar initiative,
the now defunct Multilateral Agreement on Investment, was attempted
under the auspices of the OECD, but was withdrawn in the face of broad
popular opposition. What is ironic is that the U.S. government is particu-
larly resistant to multilateral agreements on social standards, which it
rejects as constraints on sovereignty, but the United States is leading ef-
forts to subordinate its own sovereign authority and that of other nations
when the results serve private commercial purposes.
During the height of the Cold War, President John F. Kennedy in-
voked the words of his predecessor Woodrow Wilson, who brought the
United States into World War I pledging to make the world safe for de-
mocracy. Half a century later, in an address launching the Alliance for
Progress, Kennedy declared that the task of his generation was to make
the world safe for diversity. Kennedy of course meant that the United
States would not allow the Soviet Union to impose a single model of
political philosophy or economic development upon the dozens of newly
independent nations. Now, however, with the Cold War ended in favor of
liberal capitalism, making the world safe for diversity has a different and
ironic meaning. Liberal democracy is said to be pluralist, yet today there
is a risk that the triumphant ideologues of laissez-faire economics will
impose a single economic model on a diverse world-a model that
makes the world safe for investors but ignores the needs of human de-
velopment. The United States may have a chronic trade deficit in goods
and services, but it is superb at exporting economic dogmas.
[Vol. 26:19
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If this model of economic neoliberalism reliably produced prosper-
ity, one might argue that the loss of national sovereignty to global market
forces, and even the widening inequality, might be worth it. But the turn-
ing away from the mixed economy in favor of laissez-faire economics
has produced widening instability and rising inequality both between
and within nations. We have had two lost decades of development for
some of the South, rising financial volatility, and worsening environ-
mental calamity. And some of the most successful nations, such as North
Korea and China, have radically departed from the neoliberal recipe. Yet,
despite this record, it has also produced a new certitude that the standard
model of economic stabilization and market liberalization is the best ap-
proach, indeed, the only approach, for rich and poor nations alike.4
Let us never forget that the appropriate blend of market development
and human development is a political choice and not an economic im-
perative. My earlier book, The Economic Illusion: False Choices
Between Prosperity and Social Justice,' challenged the idea that there
was a necessary trade-off between equality and efficiency. In free market
theory, markets, by definition, optimize the allocation of resources. By
altering that allocation, through taxes, income transfers, state regula-
tions, or public investments, you may improve income distribution. By
distorting allocation, however, you worsen economic performance. If in
fact markets price many inputs and outputs incorrectly, and if the market
itself is sometimes a source of instability and irrationality, then judicious
intervention can improve performance as well as distribution.
Looking at the actual economies of the world, one can find societies
with relatively high growth that are more egalitarian, and ones that are
less egalitarian. One finds unequal societies that are good economic per-
formers, and bad ones. Looking at actual institutions, one can identify
public infrastructure programs that compensated for private market
myopia and stimulated development; and one can find pension schemes
that simultaneously increased the self-reliance of the non-rich, even as
they raised the national rate of saving and investment. One can find labor
market programs that raised the earning power of ordinary people, while
they improved productive output and macro-economic efficiency by al-
lowing economies to run closer to full employment without triggering
inflation. One can identify health, safety, and environmental regulations
that improved economic performance by prohibiting companies from
taking the low road, and forcing them to invest in technical innovation
4. See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002).
5. See ROBERT KUTTNER, THE ECONOMIC ILLUSION: FALSE CHOICES BETWEEN PROS-
PERITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1984).
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rather than treating people and the natural environment as disposable
assets. Efficiency and equality come packaged in multiple ways.
But if the trade-off between equality and efficiency is a myth, it is all
too true that pure markets are more likely to produce extreme inequality.
The more that society is operated as nothing but a marketplace, the more
it tends to produce extremes. In a world of mobile capital, relatively im-
mobile labor, and high unemployment, people with routine skills have
little bargaining power. There are untold riches for a relatively small
number of entrepreneurial winners and financial engineers. As the recent
stock market scandals demonstrated, deregulation also creates opportuni-
ties for insider opportunism that "self-regulating" market forces do not
limit or correct until after substantial damage has been done. This also
widens income inequalities. The more the social constraints on the mar-
ket are weakened, the more inequality we see. If the market is the entire
world, the extremes only widen. As Robert Frank observed,6 the bigger
the economic stage, the more extreme the winnings of the biggest win-
ner. So on both grounds-equality and efficiency-we need to reinvent a
mixed economy-one that maximizes both sustainable economic growth
and equitable human development.
Nor is there a simple correlation between a laissez-faire economy
and political democracy. A command economy, certainly, tends to re-
quire a command state. Capitalism, by contrast, has coexisted nicely
with the stable parliamentary democracies of the North, but it has also
dwelt all too easily with Nazis, fascists, mafias, and traditional despots.
Racialist South Africa was very hospitable to private capital. So were
countless military dictators in primary-producing countries. Multina-
tional corporations like the enforced social peace and the low labor costs
of dictatorship. Indeed, early capitalism coexisted easily with slavery
and with the extermination of native peoples. Markets, by themselves, do
not spontaneously produce the combination of order and accountability
on which efficient capitalism depends. The latest case in point is gang-
ster capitalism in post-Soviet Russia.
So let us not make the mistake of assuming that the greatest degree
of free market equals the greatest degree of political freedom, any more
than we should assume that laissez-faire economics maximizes growth.
The case for political democracy must be made on its own merits. Often
the nations with the most successful expansion of political democracy to
working people have been those that also succeeded at tempering the
extremes of markets, to make that democracy real.
6. See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY
(1995).
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II. RESTATING THE PRACTICAL CHOICES
In Everything for Sale, I suggest that there are really three entirely
different kinds of efficiency, and that standard economics has trouble
integrating them into a common analytical framework.7 There is, first,
the usual efficiency of the price system-the efficiency of allocation.
That is the efficiency of Adam Smith, and the kind cherished by laissez-
faire economists. However, there is also the macroeconomic efficiency
of John Maynard Keynes. If an economy has twenty percent unemploy-
ment, the price system may be operating normally, but it is producing an
outcome that is collectively inefficient since it leaves twenty percent of
the human resources needlessly idle. In these circumstances, the price
system is not capable of correcting the inefficiency, since price reduc-
tions in the face of slack demand will only deepen the recession.
Governments can violate the price system by using public investments to
stimulate the economy and put idle people back to work, and the out-
come will be more efficient, despite the interference with the price
system. World War II was an assault on market pricing, but it ended the
Great Depression. The third sort of efficiency is innovative. One of the
market's greatest failures is its failure to invest adequately in research.
Studies by the economist Edwin Mansfield and others have carefully
investigated the gap between the return to society from investment in
innovation and the private return captured by the entrepreneur. The so-
cial return is at least double the private return-which means that private
investors do not,' indeed cannot, invest optimally in research, technical
innovation, or human capital, because they will not capture all of the
returns. This is the third efficiency-the efficiency of technical progress,
an efficiency associated with the economist Joseph Schumpeter. The ef-
ficiency of Smith relies on the price system, but the efficiencies of
Keynes and Schumpeter suggest that the price system often gets things
wrong. If that is so, state intervention or criteria other than profit-
maximizing ones can improve outcomes. The emerging laissez-faire
rules of the trading system, however, condemn state investments as ille-
gitimate distortions.
In an earlier time, virtually all of the currently wealthy nations
intuitively understood that a laissez-faire approach was not the optimal
path for economic development. The United States, long before Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal, had interventionist policies for land tenure,
development of agriculture, railroads and canals, the creation of the
aircraft, and radio industries. During its first century, the United States had
high tariffs. With World War H and the Cold War, it devised the world's
7. See KUTTNER, supra note 1.
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most extensive science and technology policy; this was deemed
compatible with a laissez-faire ideology, because it was for national
security purposes, and, therefore, deemed not to really count. The
technological spillovers were accidental and incidental.
Germany, France, and Japan, are of course famous for state led eco-
nomic growth. Germany, the most liberal of the three, uses banks rather
than equities markets, has an indulgent view of cartels, and employs a
variety of more subtle mechanisms of economic nationalism. Even Brit-
ain, the historical champion of free commerce, combined its support for
laissez-faire government with its operation of an empire. It is hard to
reconcile imperial preference with liberal trade.
My point is not to criticize retroactively the policies that the devel-
oped nations used decades and centuries ago. On the contrary, I suggest
that the world's richest and most powerful countries understood in their
own earlier stages of economic growth that private markets were capri-
cious and that States had a role to play in economic development. They
understood that their own sovereignty required that while they might
welcome a partial role for foreign capital and for trade, they could not
leave their fates entirely dependent on a global market and the whims
and fashions of private investors. It is of course ironic that today's most
powerful nations would deny the mixed development strategy that they
themselves pursued to today's newly emergent economies. It is also the
case that the most successful economies of the post war era have been
precisely those, mainly in Asia, that combined a fierce entrepreneurial
skill with a strong developmental role for the state; i combination of
capitalism and neo-mercantilism. It is bizarre that champions of laissez-
faire economics claim China's ten percent annual growth rate as evi-
dence for their side of the argument. This is a nation, after all, that pegs
its currency, has neither transparent capital markets nor western style
human rights, whose industry and banking system is still dominated by
the state, and who allows in foreign investment only on carefully negoti-
ated terms.
"Free trade" versus "protectionism" misstates the practical choices.
This is not a two-way debate between free traders and protectionists, but
a rather richer and more complex four-way argument. One view is the
laissez-faire recipe advocated by proponents of the Washington Consen-
sus, as an architecture of global commerce that is good for the global
system, and by extension, good for the United States. Second, there are
domestic critics of the Washington Consensus who feel that it places geo-
political U.S. goals and gains for certain sectors, such as finance, ahead of
U.S. economic goals, to the disadvantage of other domestic sectors such as
industrial workers. This critique is sometimes self-interested, sometimes
[Vol. 26:19
Development, Globalization, and Law
principled. Third, there are non-U.S. critics of the Washington Consensus
who resent the imposition of a one-size-fits-all model, and who accuse the
United States, with some justice, of practicing a double standard. These
critics are very skeptical of labor and environmental standards, which they
see as just another variant of protection for the rich North, but also want to
be able to use domestic development policies that neoliberals consider
mercantilist. Finally, there are principled advocates of a mixed economy,
who believe that the neoliberal recipe is neither optimal for most actors in
the U.S. economy, nor for human development objectives, nor for the sta-
bility, sustainability, and performance of the system as a whole. I would
put myself in this fourth group.
The quarter century after World War II was a golden age, in both the
North and South, of managed capitalism and the mixed economy and of
tolerable distribution and security. The developed nations grew smartly,
and the third world grew even faster. This was supremely the era of eco-
nomic management. The financial underpinnings of the first Bretton
Woods system were probably unsustainable because of the special role
of the U.S. dollar, which had to diminish as other countries developed.
But the collapse of Bretton Woods, combined with the oil price in-
creases, the resultant heavy borrowing of non petroleum exporting
developing countries, followed by the abrupt increase in interest rates,
created a new geo-economic reality which in turn produced new political
leverage for the advocates of neoliberalism, at a time when prevailing
ideology was shifting to laissez-faire. The IMF, in concert with commer-
cial banks and national leaders newly committed to a laissez-faire
approach, devised a new set of stabilization policies and enjoyed a new
capacity to enforce them.
Instead of providing countervailing public financial institutions to
counter-balance the global financial tendencies to austerity and contrac-
tion, the Bretton Woods institutions became the agents of austerity and
contraction. Instead of serving to facilitate the management of a mixed
economy, they became instruments of laissez-faire economics, condi-
tioning financial assistance upon an economic program that would have
been unrecognizable to the 1944 architects.
The Washington Consensus reflects a reversion to the pre-Roosevelt
view that markets are, by definition, efficient, and that interferences with
markets are, be definition, unwise. The approved recipe has called for
"getting prices right" by reducing public sector outlays, frequently by de-
valuing, deregulating and privatizing, opening national capital markets,
and making the domestic economy friendly to foreign private investment.
All of these measures are supposed to increase allocative efficiency. For-
eign capital is supposed to pour into nations that offer above-average
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returns; investment then yields higher growth. This formula has been ap-
plied to nations as diverse as the formerly communist countries of central
and eastern Europe, the nations of Latin America suffering from excess
debt, and the extremely poor countries of sub-Saharan Africa. These eco-
nomic stabilization policies have been a rousing success at opening
markets and collecting debts. They have not been so successful for poor
countries and poor people. Sometimes, they have produced merely "hot"
financial flows and speculative volatility rather than patient capital for
long-term development, as in the case of the East Asian induced depres-
sion of the late 1990s.
The record of this approach is mixed at best. Many of the most suc-
cessful developing economies are precisely those that violated the recipe
of the Washington Consensus-those that "got prices wrong," as it were,
in order to get cheap capital to domestic industry. These were the nations
that remained largely closed to foreign capital or that admitted foreign
investment only on carefully negotiated and managed terms, and, there-
fore, relied heavily on domestic savings.
Elsewhere, the sacrifices were great, but the rewards were far lower
than predicted. In this neoliberal era, the global rate of growth has re-
mained well under three percent. The pursuit of allocative efficiency,
because it represents only one form of efficiency, has created many sac-
rifices but only mediocre benefits. The loss of the efficiencies of
technical innovation and high employment economies has generated off-
setting costs. Standard neoliberal theory predicts that marketization will
lead to convergence. Investors in capital-rich countries will perceive op-
portunities for supernormal growth in poor countries. They will send
them their capital, growth and high profits will ensue, and all will be
well. But as Angus Maddison has shown, in an OECD study,8 the story
of recent decades has been divergence, not convergence. With the excep-
tion of a few Asian countries, all of which violated the laissez-faire
formula, per capita incomes in the South have been declining relative to
northern incomes.
The promised flow of both portfolio capital and direct foreign in-
vestment into poor countries has also been disappointing, as has the
growth of north-south trade. It remains the case that for most countries,
capital is primarily generated domestically, from local savings and the
profits of national industry. The benefits of foreign investment are often
dwarfed by the costs of its volatility. Countries that relied most heavily
on foreign investment have generally had lower growth rates than those
that relied on domestic savings. As the economist Alice Amsden has cal-
culated from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
8. See ANGUS MADDISON, MONITORING THE WORLD ECONOMY 1820-1992 (1995).
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(UNCTAD) reports, foreign direct investment relative to gross fixed
capital formation has been less than five percent in most developing
countries, and less than two percent in several of the most successful
ones.9 In other countries, it has gyrated wildly.'0
Even worse than its effects on individual economies, the current neo-
liberal regime of global finance creates a profound contractionary bias,
just as the founders of the Bretton Woods institutions understood. A
global financial system operated in the interest of bondholders, foreign
exchange traders, and private investors, will be inflation-averse to the
point of resisting available rates of growth. When world growth is held to
the rate of population increase, and that growth is maldistributed, we will
never achieve the goals of human development no matter how much sac-
rifice is extracted in the short run. While some countries undoubtedly
need the fiscal discipline that the IMF invariably commends, the cumula-
tive weight of these adjustment programs cuts in the direction of global
economic contraction. Is there an offsetting benefit in the form of alloca-
tive efficiency and greater investment flows? On balance, there is not.
The developing world emphatically needs flows of capital from the
developed North, just as it needs opportunities to export goods and ser-
vices. But those flows of capital and goods need to be on terms that
promote long-term, stable, and sustainable development, and not mere
financial speculation. The flow of purely financial foreign exchange is
now one and a half trillion U.S. dollars daily-more than seventy times
the flow of world trade. As recently as 1980, that ratio was just ten to
one.
I am encouraged that the current leadership of the World Bank has be-
gun to tolerate greater divergence from the standard formula, and I hope
this is a harbinger of changes to come. There is some renewed acceptance
that the public sector can play a constructive role, even that constraints on
capital flows and financial regulation are sometimes salutary. We are see-
ing a slightly less dogmatic and austere form of conditionality, as well as
somewhat less project micromanagement. It remains to be seen whether
this movement will be complemented by a new era of international insti-
tution building.
Of course, even if the Bretton Woods institutions accord greater re-
spect to diverse paths to development, the fundamental problem of the
ungovernability of a global economy remains. During the so-called
global age after World War II, socially tolerable mixed economies were
built by national governments. A decent balance between market and
9. See ALICE AMSDEN, THE RISE OF THE REST: CHALLENGES TO THE WEST FROM
LATE INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES (2001).
10. See id.
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society was obtained. This project is difficult, if not impossible, when
the economy is global.
The polity did not decide, gratuitously, to govern the marketplace
out of perverse or "special interest" impulses. States intervened precisely
because pure markets were neither stable nor reliable, and they rendered
decisions that were economically inefficient, morally indefensible, and
politically unbearable. The market indeed produces Joseph Schumpeter's
famous "creative destruction." This is precisely why polities need to bro-
ker social compacts to make that turbulence and dislocation socially,
economically, and politically tolerable. Karl Polanyi, in his classic work,
The Great Transformation, recounts how the undermining of traditional
societies and their social compromises by the great transformation of
nineteenth century capitalism ultimately generated so much insecurity
and turmoil that it led to a twentieth century backlash of tribalism, totali-
tarianism, and war." Another market paradox: taken to an extreme,
economic liberalism leads to illiberal politics. Polanyi wrote: ". . . the
idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution
could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human
and material substance of society.... ,,2 Polayni continues "... to allow
the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human beings
and their natural environment, and indeed, of the amount and use of pur-
chasing power, would result in the demolition of society."'3
People may be economic actors in a global marketplace, but they are
still citizens of Nation-States. They still look to their national govern-
ments for economic security, education, health, and political rights. They
still blame national leaders when things turn out badly; they do not
blame Deutsche Bank, General Motors, or the Director-General of the
WTO. Indeed, the more the global market is rampant, the more people
look to their national governments to clean up the human damage. I am a
voting citizen of the United States. There are no citizens of the Republic
of NAFTA. The European Union (EU), a transnational polity with
emerging institutions of civic accountability and deliberate efforts to nar-
row an acknowledged "democratic deficit," remains the exception.
Several recent books have observed that the more the economy be-
comes fluid and global, the more anxious people, looking for moorings,
become tribal.' 4 A vocabulary of facile globalism is for the elite-those
people who thrive in a world of computerized currency trades, conferences
11. See POLANYI, supra note 3.
12. Id. at3.
13. Id. at 73.
14. See e.g. JOHN NAISBITT, GLOBAL PARADOX: THE BIGGER THE WORLD ECONOMY,
THE MORE POWERFUL ITS SMALLEST PLAYERS (1994); see also BENJAMIN BARBER, JIHAD VS.
MCWORLD (2001).
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at Davos, and cross-border conglomerate deals. It is a relatively small stra-
tum that personally benefit from global economic integration-those who
the U.S. Labor Secretary Robert Reich has called the class of "symbolic
analysts." But for the billions of ordinary people who are tied to their
countries and even their villages by the limits of immigration laws, low
educations, and the plain, grinding realities of poverty, the global econ-
omy often represents merely a loss of what little control they have-a
dependency on capricious forces far beyond their reach that seldom act
on their best interests. The loss of local sovereignty, and the increasing
power of multinational capital, politically accountable to no one, pro-
duces a backlash.
Karl Marx was wrong to imagine the withering away of the State,
but so are ultra neoliberals. The State, let us never forget, is not just the
instrument of a necessarily mixed economy. It is the necessary locus of
political democracy. Too often in our era, the problem has not just been
States that are too strong and that trample the rights of their people, but
States that are too weak and too lacking in legitimacy to guarantee civil
order, to broker social consensus, to protect private property, and to
counterbalance the extremes of the market. In Soviet Russia, the prob-
lem was that the totalitarian State was too strong. In post-Soviet Russia,
the problem is that the democratic State is too weak. You don't just re-
move the constraints on private capital and expect civil society and
mannered markets to appear full blown. Take away a discredited State,
liberate market forces, and what fills the vacuum?-private, tribal ma-
fias. The creation of civil society and the domestication of private capital
is a gradual, iterative, and consensual process. And at its center is legiti-
mate, democratically accountable government.
In the history of the United States, the early revolutionaries against
the British Crown first thought that the best guarantor of the rights of the
people was a weak State. After a few years they realized that a weak
state was a weak protector of political liberty and a weak promoter of
public purpose. And so they went back, scrapped the Articles of Confed-
eration, and wrote a Constitution with a stronger national government-
precisely to promote national development, protect liberty, and broker
domestic social peace.
The entire history of political democracy is the converting of au-
thoritarian States to democratic purposes, building administrative
competence that is popularly accountable, and making the State an effec-
tive counterweight to the market, as well as a partner in private
development. The State is the realm of citizenship, or political rights,
public goods, and minimum social standards. So, to the extent that the
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global market is overwhelming the democratic polity, this is a loss, not a
gain for human development.
The history of the past century displays an ongoing tug of war be-
tween market and polity. But it is not inevitable that this process move
one way. Indeed, the more dislocation the market produces, the more
there will be pressure for some kind of redress. The danger is precisely
that it will be ugly, nationalistic redress, rather than redress consistent
with peace, liberty, human development, and democratic order.
How can the state regain some capacity to direct markets to human
purposes? There are three basic approaches. The first approach involves
attempting to allow Nation-States to reclaim some authority vis-ai-vis
markets. The second alternative looks to new regional groupings such as
the EU. Or, the third approach attempts to construct global institutions of
governance.
There are problems and possibilities with each of these. In a climate
where the trend is towards greater market liberalization and greater global-
ization, a Nation-State that attempts to reassert authority risks appearing,
or even being, merely protectionist. A State with costly social overhead,
competent regulation and efficiently enforced taxation risks pricing itself
out of the market for global capital seeking cheap labor, weak regulation,
and low taxation. Still, the reregulation of areas such as the environment,
child labor, banking and accounting standards, aircraft safety, and money
laundering by terrorists, suggests that the Nation-State is not entirely
helpless in the face of global capital. The Clinton administration was on
the verge of negotiating an agreement with Europe under the auspices of
the OECD to basically put tax havens out of business, until the Bush
administration killed the initiative. So the perceived impotence of the
state is more a matter of ideological fashion and the balance of political
forces than a case of irreversible change and institutional bankruptcy of
the Nation-State.
With respect to regional groupings, the course of least resistance is
to devise trading blocs that merely accelerate the move towards laissez-
faire governance, but on a preferential, regional basis. A case in point is
NAFTA. One problem with NAFTA is that it was negotiated on terms far
more beneficial to the United States and to investors in the three member
nations of the United States, Canada and Mexico, than to Mexico or to
ordinary citizens.
A second problem is that NAFTA does almost nothing to devise re-
gional institutions of governance to replace national ones. It is basically
a free trade bloc and not a regional polity. Its side agreements on labor
and environmental standards are feeble and virtually unenforceable.
NAFTA also creates preferential access for the three member nations, at
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the expense of third party exporting countries, and this certainly violates
the spirit of global nondiscrimination.
A more attractive case, as noted, is the EU, which is, at least, an
emergent transnational polity. The ideological import of the EU has re-
versed at least once, since the Treaty of Rome. At first, it was supported
by economic liberals, as an instrument of free commerce. Later, as pri-
vate commerce overtook the regulatory capacity of European nation-
states, labor and social democratic parties looked to Brussels as a trans-
national emergent government that could maintain social regulation of
capital on a continental scale. Now, in another reversal, there is a new
struggle over whether the EU will become the province of fiscal auster-
ity and slow growth. But at least, the EU represents an effort to build a
supranational institution of governance, to balance market objectives
with social ones.
The most difficult task of all, it seems to me, is to replicate institu-
tions of governance at a global level, for the purpose of humanizing the
market economy. For one thing, Nation-States are reluctant to cede real
sovereignty to institutions of global governance, except when this proc-
ess serves corporate or geopolitical interests. Even the most modest
sharing of authority produces nationalistic backlashes. The United States
has been willing to create global institutions, only to the extent that they
represent surrogates for U.S. geopolitical or economic goals. Most of the
existing global financial institutions accelerate marketization rather than
govern and temper it.
The United States has not ratified even the core labor standards of
the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention, and there is
reluctance to subject environmental goals to international regulation.
This process is further complicated by the ambivalence of poor coun-
tries. Many of the world's most vulnerable nations, already subject to the
dictates of the IMF, the World Bank, the commercial lending banks, and
the WTO, are ambivalent about whether to subject themselves to further
encroachments upon their sovereignty, even for such worthy goals as
labor rights, women's rights, and environmental protection. Sometimes,
a high minded concern for labor rights can be used as a pretext for pro-
tection. Raising very poor countries to the levels of environmental
protection desired by rich countries can deny poor countries the same
means of economic development used wantonly by now-rich countries,
at an earlier state of development when there was less solicitude for the
earth.
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III. SERVING HUMAN SOCIETIES
So, what can we do? As a first principle, we need to acknowledge
that human development requires managing markets as well as liberating
them. We need to acknowledge that markets, left to their own devices,
often produce a race to the bottom-a global search for the locality with
the weakest regulatory, environmental, social, and labor standards. A
regime of private bankers or their public agents is a regime of deflation
and slow growth.
By way of remedy, we should look for more assertive global stan-
dards, taking care that these not be instruments of mere protectionism.
Raising wages and working conditions in poor countries is good for
working people in all countries, because it increases purchasing power,
living standards, and precludes a race to the bottom. It is not healthy
when multinational corporations play off tax bases and work forces.
Through some global body, we need to assure decent social minima.
Some leaders of developing countries see labor standards as an inter-
ference with sovereignty. But many of these leaders are all too compliant
when the interference with sovereignty comes from the IMF on behalf of
private creditors and investors. Many such protestations are nothing but
alibis for multinational corporations that could easily do better by their
employees. If we can put restraints on sovereignty for the sake of capital,
we can surely do it for labor.
The same is true of the environment. But here again, we must take
great care that the new concern for sustainable development in the rich
countries not be pretext for denying development to poor ones. The
wealthy countries are the main culprits because their consumption of
nonrenewable energy results in most of the pollutants. It is hard to take
seriously the leadership of countries that will not tax themselves to re-
duce energy pollution. It is even harder to accept that poor countries
should reduce living standards already on the edge of destitution, when
affluent countries will not take even moderate steps.
The conflict is less between poor and rich countries than between the
broad interests of peoples and the narrow interests of extractive indus-
tries. We need to find our way towards some kind of global regime that
reduces emissions of greenhouse gasses, but well-off nations need to
transfer the technology to make this possible, rather than viewing this
shift as one more opportunity for private industry to profit.
We also need serious debt relief for poor countries. But debt relief,
even if extremely generous, is not satisfactory, as the rest of the Wash-
ington Consensus dictates a single universal economic model.
World War II occurred, in part, because the allies of World War I
were too slow to give Germany debt relief. Ultimately in the 1930s, there
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were countless defaults on World War I debts, but it was too late. In the
1980s, we succeeded in gradually working down the oil-recycling debt
over more than a decade, but at far too high a price. Higher growth
would more than compensate for the financial losses of greater debt re-
lief. The rich countries have been too stingy with debt relief, and too
often have limited it for political purposes.
The same is true of development aid. Just as there are domestic pub-
lic goods, so there are global ones. A public good, by definition, is
something to which the market price system does not accord adequate
respect. If we believe this is a single, integrated global economy, we
need a global approach to the cultivation of public goods such as educa-
tion, public health, and public infrastructure. That means investment
should not exclusively be private and directed at private goods.
We need to return to something like the spirit of the original Bretton
Woods-a commitment to high growth, full employment, and financial
management aimed at expansion rather than austerity. This does not
mean reverting to the rigid, fixed exchange rate system and the capital
controls of Bretton Woods, but it does mean abandoning the cookie-
cutter approach to structural adjustment and stabilization defined as aus-
terity. We also need to slow down the dizzy dominance of currency
traders, which causes the financial economy to overwhelm the real econ-
omy, and, far from helping markets to get prices right, becomes its own
source of instability. A Tobin tax on purely financial transactions would
be salutary.
If we pursue a grail of letting laissez-faire markets dictate all deci-
sions about the allocation of resources and allow markets to lead a race
to the social bottom, there will be avoidable human misery. We know
that state socialism failed. It deprived hundreds of millions of people of
both liberty and prosperity. We also know that market forces, taken to an
extreme, yield tepid rates of growth, plunder the natural environment,
and create human wreckage.
We need to recognize what economic model truly describes reality,
based on what we have learned from economic history, not from abstract
modeling. We also need to assess how law is used to maximize human
possibilities or to serve those who happen to enjoy political power.
Law, in this context, can serve a more balanced model of develop-
ment, or one that mainly protects private property rights. This debate has
raged for more than a century in the so-called advanced democracies. It
is both political and empirical. The argument about what sort of law
should govern global commerce can be settled by the presumption-in
both senses of the word-that a laissez-faire approach is always better.
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The nations of the developing world are not just "emerging mar-
kets," as the phrase has it. They are human societies. It is high time to
make markets our servant, not our master. We need to appreciate the
power of the engine, but recognize that it needs to be steered; and to re-
spect that human ingenuity and social consensus take as many diverse
forms as there are diverse cultures. Commerce may be global, but the
paths to human development are substantially local. We have not reached
the end of history, and those who think so should read some history with
more humility.
